Introduction - Reconciliation in the Western Balkans: New Perspectives and Proposals by Blondel, Cyril & Petričušić, Antonija
  
1 
 
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe  
Vol 11, No 4, 2012, 1-6 
 
Copyright © ECMI 2013 
This article is located at:   
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2012/Petricusic.pdf 
 
 
Introduction - Reconciliation in the Western Balkans: New 
Perspectives and Proposals 
 
 
Antonija Petričušić and Cyril Blondel* 
University of Zagreb and University of Tours 
 
 
 
 
Dealing with a legacy of war crimes and human rights violations is a common 
challenge in post-conflict societies. This is particularly the case in the Western Balkan 
countries in which, as Sisson (2010: 172) puts it, a “decade of internecine war in the 
region had left behind not only a terrible legacy of human losses and material 
destruction, but also an unprecedented level of traumatization among the population at 
large, which contributed to a widespread and generalized sense of victimhood on all 
sides of the conflict”. The violent conflicts cemented deep ethnic cleavages that were, 
as a result of peace settlements, mirrored in institutional mechanisms, which further 
contributed to a preservation of ethnic divides. Post-conflict integrative normative 
solutions, such as assurance of minority participation in public life and power-sharing 
mechanisms, have contributed to the re-emergence of cooperation and, to a certain 
degree, to the normalization of relations between different ethnic communities across 
the region. However, the guarantee of minority rights means little for interethnic 
rapprochement and the reduction of the social distance between formerly warring 
communities if policy makers hold that minority legislation should merely allow for 
the preservation of minority identities and assure proportional political participation in 
decision-making processes. In a post-conflict scenario policy-makers should also 
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focus on the rectification of ethnic homogenization and the increase of interethnic 
tolerance. In addition, advanced normative frameworks on minority protection in the 
Western Balkans can only be effectively used if accompanied with a thorough 
implementation and support by political actors at all levels of governance, which still 
is not a case in the majority of the countries that were involved in the conflict. This 
brings the conclusion that current domestic normative and institutional mechanisms 
are not yet sufficient to foster reconciliation and the systemic acceptance of tolerance. 
The internationalization of transitional justice, societal reconstruction and 
reconciliation, which is being pursued through the EU Stabilization and Accession 
Process, serves as the most promising incentive for the enhancement of post-conflict 
reconciliation in the region (Rupnik, 2007). The (potential) candidate countries in the 
Western Balkans are being exposed to a threefold post-conflict conditioning. The first 
part of conditionality entails the normative-institutional requirement set in the 
Copenhagen criterion requiring “respect for and protection of minority rights”. The 
second component of conditionality, aimed at the systematic elimination of impunity 
for war crimes and human rights abuses, requires the (potential) candidate countries’ 
commitment to judicial prosecution of war crimes in domestic criminal courts and 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). Finally, the third component of the conditionality requires the countries of 
the region to, inter alia, foster reconciliatory efforts through the return of refugees, by 
settling disputes over property rights and compensating refugees, by developing 
neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, establishing truth and reconciliation 
commissions, and through public apologies by political leaders. By insisting on 
reforming and building these societal structures, the EU is, in a way, exporting the 
values upon which it has been built on: peace, reconciliation, democracy, rule of law 
and respect of human rights, including the rights of national minorities. 
In the course of the EU accession, a (potential) candidate country is expected 
to foster a spirit of tolerance towards its minorities and take appropriate measures to 
protect those who are subjected to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or 
violence. War crime trials should have provided accountability and individualized 
guilt, since the truth-finding component of this transitional justice mechanism had the 
objective of contributing to the creation of a climate of trust that would facilitate 
reconciliation. However, the ICTY is widely perceived as unfair, partial and 
unobjective by people in the former Yugoslavia. The lack of popular trust in the ICTY 
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failed to result in the building of interpersonal trust. The rather limited results in post-
conflict societal reconstruction, of which the ICTY is just an example, might be 
explained by the fact that they are mainly reconciliatory attempts triggered and 
supported by foreign donors. Probably the most comprehensive “mechanistic 
international requirement” (Subotić, 2009: xii) was set up in the objective of the ICTY 
to “contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace”. However, in the everyday 
life of Western Balkans citizens, this particular transitional justice and reconciliation 
mechanism resulted in even negative societal effects since its mandate was not 
explained as legitimate and necessary to the electorate by domestic political elites. 
Morover, submission to international demands has often threatened political elites’ 
domestic credibility and weakened their domestic political competition (Meernik, 
Nichols and King, 2010; Grodsky, 2009; Minow, 2008; Peskin, 2008). Commitment 
to transitional justice and reconciliatory goals therefore often came at the cost of 
reformist political options. 
With the exception of a few high political figures and civil society 
organizations, the “R” word is left out of public discourse, and is almost not present in 
the media or in the educational process. Needless to say, continuous denial of war 
crimes by some senior politicians on all sides seriously undermines reconciliation 
(Spoerri, 2012; Subotić, 2009). Nationalist politicians claim that, in order for them to 
speak about reconciliation, a preceding demonstration of good-will intentions from 
the side of a former enemy is needed, i.e. an apology by a former enemy for 
wrongdoings, recognition and compensation for casualties and destruction of 
property, accepting responsibility for war crimes and their thorough prosecution 
and/or financial restitution of war damages. The discourse on victimhood - which 
Daniela Mehler describes in her article as a trend of “patriotic voices” of those who 
require the recognition of victim status for their own group, with a parallel emotional 
detachment for victims of a different ethnicity - can be spotted across the region and 
leads to the conclusion that reconciliation efforts have not yet taken roots in the 
Balkans. This “gap between people and politics” in embracing reconciliatory stances 
has already been documented (Perry, 2009), and that missing link, i.e. the absence of 
reconciliatory aspirations on the side of the wider population, hampers the emergence 
of transformative change in the societies in question. 
This volume demonstrates that different conceptualizations of post-conflict 
reconciliation are not only possible, but also necessary (Moreau Defarges, 1999). 
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Drawing on the concepts and discourses of reconciliation presented in this volume, 
reconciliation can be defined as a long-term goal of the post-conflict transformation of 
societies. All countries of the Western Balkans that were involved in the inter-ethnic 
conflicts are hereby included in the analysis: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia. The authors assumed different stances in analyzing 
successes and constraints in post-conflict reconciliation: political, symbolic, private, 
and systemic. The various conceptual approaches offered in this volume aim at 
providing new perspectives for reconciliation in the Western Balkans. 
Lars Burema’s distinction between the backward-looking element of 
reconciliation (i.e. dealing with the past) and its forward-looking element (i.e. the 
building of trust) is reflected in all articles of this volume. Burema describes the 
constraints of reconciliation in Kosovo. Whereas territory in northern Kosovo is still 
contested between Serbia and Kosovo, the Serbs and Albanians in southern Kosovo 
have established a form of non-violent coexistence. Burema however argues that 
coexistence in southern Kosovo is built on separation rather that inclusion and 
cooperation, since for genuine reconciliation a cessation of conflict is insufficient if 
not followed by an agreement between the conflicting parties on the basic rules of 
dialogue. 
Cvete Koneska argues that political elites are those who play a crucial role in 
post-conflict politics and the preservation of a fragile peace, and explores their 
interaction and cooperation in setting up a post-conflict education policy in 
Macedonia. This issue has turned out to be one of the most controversial policy issues 
straining relations between the ethnic Albanian minority and the Macedonian state 
since the early 1990s. In addition, Koneska argues that the institutional and 
constitutional system adopted after the 2001 conflict has enhanced interethnic elite 
cooperation in Macedonia, but has not contributed significantly to the elimination of 
ethnic cleavages at the local level. 
Ankica Kosić and Stefano Livi explore socio-psychological factors that may 
facilitate reconciliation among youth. Their research, conducted in the city of 
Vukovar in Croatia, deals with the perceived parental communication of sureveyed 
students, conflict management styles present within their families, young people’s 
sense of victimhood, and their propensity toward reconciliation. Interestingly, results 
show that negative intergroup emotions are more likely among young persons who 
experienced material and personal losses, but this is not hampering their willingness 
Petričušić and Blondel, Introduction 
5 
 
to accept social relationships with young people from another ethnic group. This 
research adds new evidence to the importance of parental roles in the propensity 
toward reconciliation. 
Sukanya Krishnamurthy
 
 approaches  post-conflict research in a different 
way. She explores the role that architecture or form plays in forming urban memory 
and forgetting by examining the urban palimpsest that is the Old Bridge in Mostar, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. She draws on the results of qualitative fieldwork in the city 
to establish a framework analyzing the site through two axes: one as an object seeped 
in history and commemoration, and the other through its representation as a 
monument for reconciliation – pre-destruction, post-destruction, and in its 
reconstruction as a replica of the original bridge. The article shows that an urban 
artefact enables interaction with a site of memory and connection to a collective past. 
Cilian Mc Grattan’s article is based on an assumption that truth and 
reconciliation processes in post-conflict societies enhance the consolidation of 
democracy. He compares two ethnicized democracies – Northern Ireland and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina – arguing that consociational power-sharing structures have 
effectively institutionalized division and that the deconstruction of ethnicity in deeply 
divided societies of this kind can start merely with a commitment to openness by 
political elites. As long as ethnonationalist forces do not foster an increase of social 
capital, the re-building of trust, a variable much needed for reconciliation in a post-
conflict society, will not take place. 
Daniela Mehler analyzes the 2010 Serbian parliamentary debate on the 
declaration condemning the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica. Former President Tadić’s 
initiative to adopt a parliamentary resolution on this war crime stirred a public debate 
that revealed the depth of public denial for atrocities committed by Serbs and the 
refusal to face the country’s role in recent history. Mehler speaks about a normative 
gap that occures in Serbia, where declaratory support for transitional justice by the 
government and members of parliament is not being backed by the population. Mehler 
further argues that Serbian stakeholders have internalized concepts of transitional 
justice and facing the past, ascribing to them a different meaning in order to utilize 
them for their own political goals, both domestic and international. The fact that the 
current President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić publicly denied genocide in Srebrenica 
confirms the author’s arguments. 
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